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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Significant numbers of foreign workers, both legal andundocumented, are engaged in temporary work in themining, commercial agriculture and constructionsectors in Gauteng, Northern Province, Mpumalanga and
KwaZulu/Natal. The actual numbers involved are unknown and
unknowable under existing systems of data collection and migration
policy. The issue of temporary employment is inextricably liked to the
broader issue of undocumented migration to South Africa. The Aliens
Control Act is based on principles of exclusion and expulsion. Because
non-South African temporary workers have few legal modes of access to
the South African labour market, they are unprotected by law and
vulnerable to the sanctions of the Act. Penalties include criminalisation,
arrest, imprisonment and summary deportation. This report reviews the
current state of knowledge about the temporary employment
phenomenon in South Africa and the adequacy of the legal and policy
instruments for managing the movement of temporary migrants for work
in South Africa.
The first section examines the regulatory framework around
temporary employment schemes and, in particular, the “two gates” policy
inherited from the previous regime. The inherent discrimination in this
system is highlighted. The second section traces the demise of formal
temporary employment schemes and their replacement by more informal,
unregulated, systems of labour mobilisation and deployment in the
1990s. Central to this process is the continuing flow of undocumented
migrants from apartheid-ravaged countries of the region and the growing
tendency in many sectors towards flexible labour arrangements, such as
labour broking and sub-contracting. The third section of the report
focuses on the impact of post-apartheid in-migration on temporary work,
and the absence of official regulation of the sectors in which these
migrants are employed. The fact that so many workers are designated as
“illegal” by the state paradoxically increases their attractiveness to
employers in search of cheap, disposable, exploitable labour. The fourth
section examines the working and employment conditions of temporary
workers in sectors such as mining and agriculture. The picture is
incomplete and unsystematic but the extant evidence paints a disturbing
picture of continuing exploitation and abuse, particularly of women and
child migrants. Finally, the report looks at various new policy initiatives
which could have far-reaching implications for the temporary work
regime in South Africa.
The report concludes with several recommendations for policymakers.
These include a call for a more systematic research programme focused
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on temporary employment sectors and a number of suggestions: that the
government, as a matter of urgency, undertake a systematic investigation
of labour practices and working conditions in the major temporary
employment sectors; that the “two gates” policy be abolished; and that
policymakers establish a clearer distinction between immigration and
migration. Most temporary workers are migrants, not immigrants. The
Aliens Control Act is a flawed policy instrument for regulating
immigration, not migration. South Africa has an immigration policy of
sorts, but no coherent migration policy. This is a major policy gap
requiring urgent attention.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In South Africa, an increasing proportion of temporarywork in the agricultural, construction, service, and tourismsectors is being performed by foreign migrants andimmigrants.1  Although the precise numbers involved are unknown
(and probably unknowable), there is considerable regional variation in
the incidence of foreign-worker involvement in these sectors with the
highest concentrations in Gauteng, Mpumalanga and KwaZulu/Natal
provinces.2  Much of this temporary work by non-South Africans takes
place outside any formal regulatory framework. Temporary employment
— of a daily, weekly or seasonal kind — is individualised and “hidden”
with little overt monitoring or regulation by government, employers’
organisations or unions. The primary reason for this is that many
temporary workers within South Africa are undocumented “illegal”
migrants.3  South Africa thus does not have the large-scale, organised
“guest worker” or “temporary employment” schemes characteristic of
other parts of the world.4  The unregulated character of foreign worker
involvement in the temporary employment sector poses a particular
challenge for regional governments, organised labour and NGOs seeking
to improve working conditions and to develop a more humane
temporary employment regime.
A significant proportion of the temporary labour force is mobilised
through labour brokers and involved in sub-contracting employment
arrangements. Sub-contracting has been growing rapidly in all of the
major sectors in which foreign migrants are employed, especially
agriculture, construction and mining.5  The long-distance formal and
informal labour mobilisation networks of South Africa’s brokers and sub-
contractors extend well beyond South Africa’s own borders.6  The
purveyors of temporary labour are also particularly well-integrated into
local urban and rural labour markets and are able to tap the informal,
underemployed labour pool of unskilled and semi-skilled South African
and non-South African workers waiting for work on the margins of the
formal urban labour market. The ubiquitous pick-up points for day labour
in virtually all South African towns and cities are merely the most visible
manifestation of a vast informal network of information, labour
mobilisation and, of course, exploitation.
The whole issue of temporary employment in South Africa is thus
inextricably intertwined with the broader issue of undocumented
migration. How the South African government responds to this broader
challenge is a critical factor in determining the status and security of
temporary workers from outside the country. This in turn impacts on how
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and whether temporary work can or ought to be regulated and managed.
The current Aliens Control Act is, as its name implies, a piece of
legislation premised largely on principles of control, exclusion and
expulsion. Temporary workers are thus not only unprotected by law but
are vulnerable to its sanctions. The penalties include criminalisation,
arrest, imprisonment and summary deportation.7  In order to make sense
of the current character and dynamics of temporary work in South
Africa, it is thus necessary to situate it within the context of the broader
phenomenon of undocumented migration and its regulation.
The report is organised as follows. The first section examines the
South African regulatory framework around temporary employment
schemes and, in particular, the inherited “two gates” policy of the
previous regime. The second traces the demise of temporary employment
schemes and their replacement by more informal, and loosely regulated,
systems of control following large-scale movements of refugees and
undocumented migrants to South Africa in the 1980s and 1990s. The
third section focuses on the impact of post-apartheid in-migration on
temporary work and, in particular, the absence of employment regulation
in those sectors. In order to contextualise the discussion, this section first
looks more broadly at the whole undocumented migration phenomenon.
The fourth section of the report examines the evidence relating to the
implications for temporary workers of the new post-apartheid migration
regime. Finally, the report looks at various new policy initiatives which,
if adopted, could have far-reaching implications for temporary work by
non-South Africans in South Africa.
2. THE “TWO GATES” POLICY
South Africa’s borders are extremely porous and it is widelyaccepted that the flow of both legal and undocumented migrantsto the country from the Southern African DevelopmentCommunity (SADC) region and beyond has grown markedly
since 1990 (Figure 1).8  The undocumented movement occurs in
contravention of existing South African immigration legislation. The
result is, first, that many employers in the temporary work sector are able
to find sufficient foreign labour on site or in the vicinity, and do not need
to recruit cross-border through recruiting organisations and/or temporary
employment schemes. Second, undocumented migrants are in a
vulnerable position since their illegal status puts them beyond the
protective reach of the law and makes them particularly open to
exploitation and abuse. The pertinent question in the South African
context is, therefore, not how existing temporary employment schemes
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FIGURE 1: SADC visitors to South Africa, 1980-1995
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can be better regulated but whether temporary employment schemes
might be an instrument for regularising and legitimising the status of
temporary workers who are, at present, without any significant
protection. This paper addresses this question in the context of the
employment sectors in which foreign workers predominate.
Undocumented temporary workers in the agricultural, construction,
transport and service sectors have either entered the country
clandestinely or overstayed their temporary residence permits or secured
false documentation.9  Employers in those sectors using temporary
workers have traditionally been able to exert sufficient power over the
central or local state to avert large-scale prosecution for their use of this
labour. This is a calculated risk on the part of employers who do not
enquire too closely about the origins of their workers, or do not
particularly care as long as the labour is available and cheap. South
African employers of temporary labour undoubtedly want to continue to
employ workers from outside the country. Ironically, it is their very
illegality that makes them attractive as employees, although employers
tend to claim that South Africans will not accept the work at the wage
rates they can afford. It is this situation that South African policymakers
are increasingly exercised about. The concern is not so much with the
working and living conditions of temporary workers per se, but with the
impact that undocumented workers have on unemployment and wage
levels among South Africans. There is a widespread perception, amongst
the general public as well as a broad spectrum of policymakers, that
“illegal” temporary workers deprive South Africans of jobs and depress
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wage levels, as well as cause a whole host of other social problems 10  In
fact, there is little or no concrete evidence to substantiate these beliefs.
(A) THE ALIENS CONTROL ACT
Workers from the Southern African region seeking legal access to South
Africa are subject to a dual system of control known as the “two gates”
policy.11  The two gates are (a) the Aliens Control Act of 1991 and (b)
various bilateral labour agreements between South Africa and the
governments of Mozambique, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and
Malawi.12
The Aliens Act is an omnibus piece of legislation governing all facets
of immigration to South Africa.13  It provides specific exemptions which
make legal and administrative room for labour treaties with other
countries and temporary employment schemes for non-South African
workers. The Act does not, however, prescribe or regulate such schemes.
Rather it is permissive in its intent, allowing the Minister of Home
Affairs discretion to exempt particular employers and “special
recruitment schemes” from the provisions of the Act at his or her own
discretion.
In October 1995, the South African parliament approved a series of
amendments to the Act which were designed to tighten controls and
close loopholes in the existing legislation. The 1996 Aliens Control
Amendment Act explicitly envisages the continuation of the status quo
since it provides for continuing exemption from the Act for persons who
enter South Africa for employment: (a) under any convention with the
government of a neighbouring state, and (b) in accordance with a
“scheme of recruitment” approved by the Minister. In the past these
clauses have allowed particular employers an exemption from the Aliens
Control Act and the right to employ non-South Africans under separate
terms and conditions than those prescribed by the Act. Not surprisingly
it has been the employers with considerable political influence — the
mining industry and white commercial farmers — who took advantage of
these exemptions and, indeed, for whom they were designed.
Under the amended Act, the new categories for temporary residence
are: work permit, workseeker’s permit, visitor’s permit, business permit,
study permit and medical permit. The Act now makes it officially illegal
for someone to enter the country for one purpose (eg on holiday) and
change the purpose of visit after arrival (eg take up employment). In a
memorandum to the amended Act, the Department of Home Affairs
(DHA) states its reasons for the change of policy as: (a) the “large
numbers” of people who wish to work in the country who enter on
holiday visas and apply for work permits once inside, and (b) the fact
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that such people are prepared “to work for lower wages and that
employers preferred to employ them to the detriment of local labour.”
Temporary workers currently coming legally to South Africa as
individuals from the region do so in the shadow of the Aliens Control
Act. Temporary work occurs largely at the bottom end of the job market
and it would be difficult if not impossible to convince the DHA and its
Immigration Boards that there were no South Africans who could do
these jobs. The evidence suggests that not many temporary workers
bother to subject themselves to a bureaucratic application process that
would, in any event, have little chance of success. In addition, few if any
companies or individual employers are willing to make the case for entry
with the DHA for an individual temporary worker, as they regularly do
for skilled or professional people from abroad.
Informal access to South Africa itself is relatively easy. The most
common access route for migrants is to enter for a non-work related
purpose and then take up or resume employment once there.
Regularising that employment status was possible under the old Aliens
Control Act and often simply required a letter of support from an
employer. In practice, many temporary workers find it difficult or
inconvenient to officially change their “purpose of entry” and simply
work illegally. There is some question about whether the Amendment
Act will eliminate the possibility of temporary residents changing their
“purpose of visit” in this way.14  In the case of temporary workers this will
make little difference to a de facto situation, and the clause is far more
likely to affect skilled and professional workers. Once inside, both
undocumented migrants seeking temporary work and employers hiring
them have an interest in circumventing the Act and its enforcers.
Temporary work, particularly in the urban areas, is thus driven
underground. Employers are more than willing to risk the sanction of the
Aliens Control Act in order to extract the advantages which flow from
employing vulnerable undocumented migrants.
Studies in other countries show that if there is any hope of legal
access to a particular labour market, the volume of undocumented
migration tends to subside. Do temporary workers from the SADC region
have any means of legal access to the South African labour market? In
the past, the apartheid government was divided on the question of
employing non-South African labour at the lower end of the job market.
The DHA often pitted itself against the Departments of Foreign Affairs,
Agriculture, and Mines and Energy on this issue. Maxine Reitzes points
to similar and newer divides since 1990 resulting in an immigration
policy that is “diverse and inconsistent”.15  Since 1994, the DHA’s
position has slowly gained ascendancy. In that year, the DHA formalised
an informal policy when it announced that no immigrants in unskilled or
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semi-skilled categories would henceforth be admitted to work in the
country.16  The DHA’s Memorandum on the Aliens Control Amendment
Act of 1995 makes it clear that the onus is on employers to give
employment preference to South Africans.17  This was also stated policy
in the past but, as Cooper points out, “it is fairly clear that this policy was
not adhered to with much seriousness”.18  The Amendment Act
explicitly precludes the issue of work or immigration permits to foreign
workers wishing to follow an occupation in which there are sufficient
South Africans to do the job.
The DHA has said that it consults the Department of Labour (DL),
trade unions, industrial councils, labour organisations, educational
institutions, and professional and legislative bodies before deciding to
approve or refuse a permit.19  However, the recent Labour Market
Commission (LMC) found very little co-ordination between the DHA
and the DL on this issue. The Commission recommended that the DL
give considerable attention to developing a system of identifying job
vacancies and categories for which there were an insufficient number of
South Africans and for which foreign immigrants might apply.20  Cooper
suggests that it will become increasingly harder for non-South Africans
to legally access the South African labour market.21  Whether this
happens in practice depends very much on how the amended Act is
actually implemented and enforced.
(B) BILATERAL LABOUR TREATIES
The post-apartheid government inherited a series of bilateral labour
agreements between South Africa and the governments of Mozambique,
Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland and Malawi.22  These accords give the
South African mining industry privileged recruiting access to non-South
African labour outside the terms of the Aliens Act and although still in
force are all old agreements dating, in their current form, back to the
1960s and early 1970s. The treaties set the terms and conditions of access
by contract workers (mainly miners) to the South African labour market.
In contrast to the disorganised and highly flexible temporary
employment sector, Southern Africa also boasts the modern world’s most
highly organised and tightly regulated system of cross-border legal
migration for employment.23  The contract labour system to the South
African mines still delivers almost 200 000 foreign workers — about 50%
of the total workforce each year — to work on South Africa’s gold, coal
and platinum mines (Figure 2). The system is orchestrated by The
Employment Bureau of Africa (Teba), now an independent company
with a historical monopoly over mine recruiting in all of the various
states of Southern Africa.24  Conditions of recruiting and employment are
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FIGURE 2: Mine labour mix
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governed by a series of bilateral labour treaties between South Africa and
the surrounding states, and all mine contracts are subject to the
conditions laid out in these accords.25  Although miners would once have
been classified as “temporary workers”, in the last twenty years most have
become “stabilised”, working continuously on the mines, renewing their
contracts (now called employment agreements) each year after a fixed
period of leave.26  Contract labour to the mines falls outside the scope of
temporary employment as defined by the International Labour
Organisation (ILO).27
A new pattern of labour mobilisation has taken root in the mining
industry in the last five years. This falls under the designation “temporary
work”. Many mines are increasingly using sub-contractors to organise
production sections and to do specialised tasks.28  Sub-contractors recruit
labour from within South Africa but also from Mozambique and Lesotho.
They do so both with and without Teba’s assistance. Temporary work
with mine contractors, unlike that in other sectors, is largely governed by
the bilateral accords and the contract system of the mining industry.
The inter-governmental treaties specify a series of conditions and
obligations on the part of both South Africa and the source countries on the
following issues:29
• recruitment — including right to recruit, length of contract, length of
time between contracts, quotas, payment of recruiting fees, the need for
written contracts, and provision of facilities for recruiting and processing
contracts;
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• contracts — including identification of employer and employee, home
address of recruit, place of employment, contract length, minimum wage,
food and in-kind provision by employer, transport to and from work, and
written contracts;
• remittances and deferred pay — provision for compulsory deduction of a
proportion of wages and transfer to the home country;30
• taxation — exempting contract workers from paying tax in South
Africa;31
• documentation — including valid contracts, passports and vaccination
certificates; endorsement in passport to show purpose and period of entry;
employment record books;
• unemployment insurance;
• length of agreements; and
• appointment of labour officials to be stationed in South Africa. The
labour offices are nominally responsible for inter alia “protecting the
interests of workers”, registration of undocumented workers, transfer of
money, providing information on conditions of employment; and
consulting with the South African government on repatriation of sick or
destitute workers.32
The Malawi agreement appears to have lapsed since the expulsion of
Malawian miners from the industry in 1986 following an inter-governmental
dispute over HIV testing.33  In other cases, administrative practice has
moved beyond the provisions of the original agreement. Administrative
amendments (through the signing of diplomatic notes) have been made to
the agreements to accommodate, for example, changes in legislation in the
home countries of migrants. In some instances, through the agency of the
National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) and broader political
transformation, treaty provisions have been superseded in practice. The
treaties are reportedly being renegotiated at the present time.34
All mine recruiting by Teba falls under, and should be consistent
with, the treaties as amended from time to time. These conditions are
summarised in the standard annual Teba contract for foreign miners.35  A
variant of this contract is used by Teba for the recruiting of temporary
workers within the mining industry; particularly sub-contractors’ labour.
These contracts specify certain minimum levels of remuneration and
working conditions. They also underwrite the system of contract
migrancy by allowing for the recruitment of single men only. Miners’
dependants cannot accompany their spouses to South Africa and the
miners are contractually committed to return home on expiry of the
contract. Most miners are on fixed annual contracts. In the case of sub-
contracted labour, employer flexibility demands variable contract
lengths. The labour accords specify maximum contract lengths for all
contract workers. Recruiting for contractors by other smaller recruiters,
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such as Algos and Atas in Mozambique and Ramsdens and Acrol in
Lesotho, is also nominally bound by the terms and conditions of the
labour accords. Workers signing these recruiters’ contracts can generally
expect less favourable terms and treatment than those recruited by the
more organised and visible Teba organisation. Sub-contract labour
recruited through Teba is subject to the normal terms and conditions of
the Teba contract, although this offers them little wage protection and
no direct protection at work.
The number of workers employed by mine sub-contractors has grown
substantially in the last few years — from 5% of the goldmines workforce
in 1987 to 10% (34 733) in 1994.36  Sub-contracting has also expanded
in coal mining; from 5% of workers in 1987 to 16% in 1994 (Table 1).
Sub-contracting is related to the mines’ push for “higher productivity,
flexibility and cost-cutting” and is part of a much broader process in the
South African, and indeed global, economy.37  In the past, sub-
contracting was confined to mine development work such as shaft-
sinking and construction.38  In the last decade mines have progressively
out-contracted non-core functions such as catering and cleaning. More
recently, sub-contractors have become involved directly in production
including stoping, sweeping, haulage, meshing and lacing. Contractors
have a decided preference for labour from Mozambique and Lesotho.
Source: NUM
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This they obtain through two sources: (a) through recruiting agencies
such as Teba which recruit workers to order on non-renewable contracts
of varying length; and (b) through engaging undocumented migrants
(often ex-miners) within South Africa. The exact numbers of sub-
contract recruits are unknown, although in 1995 Teba engaged a total of
72 912 workers for non-member mines and contractors (including 18 319
Mozambicans, 11 317 Basotho, and 1 005 workers from Botswana and
Swaziland).39
Casual labour and temporary employment is not new in many sectors
of the South African economy.40  A recent feature has been the explosive
growth of labour broking. Naidoo estimates that over 100 000 temporary
employees are hired through these brokers, of which there were over
3 000 agencies in 1995.41  Labour brokers have networks that extend well
outside South Africa either recruiting themselves or “sub-letting” to
recruiters. Perhaps the largest and most organised “broker” is, in fact,
Teba. But other sectors, such as agriculture and construction, are also
supplied with foreign workers through brokers. In the case of agriculture,
recruiters in Mozambique and Lesotho and brokers in South Africa
supply workers to farmers or groups of farms, primarily on short contracts
for seasonal work. The main supplier in the case of Mozambique is Algos.
The numbers recruited in Mozambique are very small; 252 for
agriculture, 214 for services and 2 131 for mining in 1995.42  Algos also
has offices in South Africa — at Nelspruit (Mpumalanga), Johannesburg,
Empangeni (KwaZulu/Natal) and Welkom. These offices are, in a sense,
“internal recruiters”, offering a legalisation service to Mozambicans
already within South Africa. Algos also arranges the renewal of contracts
for its recruits with the Mozambican labour delegate and local DHA
offices.43  In 1995, Algos legalised or renewed the contracts of 371
miners, 10 217 agricultural workers and 1 689 workers in services. Of the
agricultural workers, 9 836 were registered in Nelspruit, 173 in
Johannesburg and 208 in Empangeni. Of the service workers, 429 were
registered in Nelspruit and 1 459 in Johannesburg.
In the case of Mozambique there is a subsidiary agreement to the
main bilateral accord between the two countries governing the
conditions by which farmers in certain South African districts can
recruit and employ Mozambican farmworkers. South Africa has
experienced a long-running conflict between the mines and the farms
over access to Mozambican labour.44  In the 1970s, the Transvaal
Agricultural Union secured for its members a subsidiary bilateral
agreement between the two governments which enabled them to recruit
labour for white farms in specified districts under the exemption clause of
the Aliens Act. The accord envisions that farmers will recruit labour
within Mozambique and seeks to regulate that process. Most of the terms
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and conditions of the general treaty apply to this subsidiary accord. In
addition, a labour exchange was established at Ressano Garcia on the
South African-Mozambique border as a recruiting office for
Mozambicans seeking entry to work on farms. The office performed a
clearing-house function for white South African farmers in possession of
permission (a “no objection” permit) obtained from the DHA under
Section 41 of the Aliens Act.45
The use of farmworkers from other countries — such as Lesotho,
Swaziland, Zimbabwe and Botswana — does not fall under any bilateral
accord. In this case, the provisions of the Aliens Control Act pertain.
However, various special arrangements — permissible under Section 41
of the Act — were put in place by the old DHA to regularise the status
of undocumented migrant farmhands by allowing post-hoc registration
and the issuing of temporary residence and work permits. In the case of
Zimbabwe, residents of the Southern Province can obtain six-month
permits to work in the Limpopo Valley. Recently the DHA and the
Zimbabwean government opened two new border access points to South
Africa explicitly to facilitate the movement of migrant farmworkers to
South Africa. The effectiveness of these “special arrangements” to
protect workers  — one of the supposed goals of the bilateral treaties —
is very much in doubt.46
In the late 1980s and early 1990s formal recruitment of non-South
African farmworkers in their country of origin became increasingly
unnecessary. The temporary employment scheme regulated by the
Mozambican bilateral accord is of declining significance. In Mpumalanga
province, as well as other commercial farming areas such as northern
KwaZulu/Natal and Northern Province, temporary workers of non-South
African origin have become increasingly accessible to employers within
South Africa itself. There were two reasons for this: (a) the large-scale
movement of refugees out of Mozambique in the 1980s and their
resettlement in bantustan areas close to some of the major farming
districts; and (b) the growing movement of undocumented migrants from
neighbouring states to South Africa, many of whom work initially on the
farms before moving on to other employment. The refugee movement,
augmented by large-scale undocumented migration since the end of the
war in Mozambique, has meant that farmers have needed to do little
formal recruiting under the contractual conditions of the bilateral
agreement.
Most migrant farmworkers from Mozambique (and countries such as
Zimbabwe, Swaziland and Lesotho) are therefore individual temporary
workers outside any formal management scheme. Farmers wishing to hire
Mozambicans write to the DL to say that they cannot obtain local labour.
Farmers are then issued with an “Article 41” permit, also known as a
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“special agricultural permit”. They then register the worker with the
Mozambican Labour Representative who organises identification papers
and the local DHA office which issues a work permit.47  The system
appears to be extremely lax, with large numbers of workers going
unregistered. One study reports that farmers in Mpumalanga experience
a complete labour turnover every three to six months.48  This fact, taken
with the R100 per capita fee, does not encourage registration. The
sanctions against non-registration are weak and ineffectual. Between
1990 and 1995, a mere six employers were charged in the Nelspruit
court.
In the Northern Province, a similar dispensation is available to
farmers employing Zimbabwean labour. There farmers are issued with six-
month special agricultural permits (Article 41’s) by the DHA to employ
undocumented Zimbabwean migrants. In northern KwaZulu/Natal
farmers employing Mozambicans received a blanket dispensation to
employ Mozambicans in the 1980s. In 1995, this was replaced by a
registration system similar to that in Mpumalanga and Northern
Province. The farmers register their workers with the local Mozambican
Labour Officer in Empangeni and then get a work permit from the local
DHA office for registered workers.
Even less is known about labour mobilisation and employment
strategies in the construction industry, another major employer of non-
South African labour. The ILO detects a “growing informalisation” of
construction labour through labour broking and own-account work,
although it is likely that the market for construction labour has always
been relatively disorganised and informal.49
3. FROM REFUGEES TO ALIENS
Who are the Mozambicans within South Africa that em-ployers are recruiting or hiring on a temporary basis andregistering with the authorities? In the 1980s, the large-scale movement of Mozambican refugees fleeing the
South African-sponsored civil war in that country transformed the
market for temporary employment in South Africa. An estimated
350 000 Mozambican refugees were in South Africa by the early 1990s.50
The apartheid government refused to grant refugee status to those
Mozambicans who managed to circumvent the border controls designed
to keep them out (including the notorious electrified “snake” fence on
the border between the two countries). As Nolan and Nkuna point out,
many of the key refugee rights accorded to refugees under the 1951
United Nations (UN) Convention and the 1969 Organisation of African
Unity (OAU) Convention have not been observed.51  Indeed, South
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Africa did not even accede to these conventions on refugees until 1993.
However, the homeland administrations of Gazankulu and Kangwane
gave refugees sanctuary. The South African government tolerated this as
long as the refugees remained there. Those leaving these areas were
immediately liable to arrest and deportation under the Aliens Control
Act.
Rights and privileges accorded to refugees under international
conventions — including the right to identity documents, freedom of
movement, and freedom to seek work — were denied to Mozambican
refugees. There is evidence that even after 1993, when the government
belatedly accorded them “refugee status”, their rights remained restricted.
As recently as 1994, the DHA would still only recognise Mozambicans in
rural South Africa as refugees. Mozambican refugees were never issued
with identity papers or travel documents, the “sine qua non for
enjoyment of most other refugee rights” and “the key to protection from
arbitrary arrest, detention and deportation”.52  Refugees only enjoyed
protection from arrest and deportation if they stayed in the designated
areas. Arrests and deportation of Mozambicans living in towns escalated
dramatically through the 1990s. All were regarded as “illegal aliens” not
refugees. In March 1995, the South African government announced that
it would no longer recognise Mozambicans as refugees.53
During the 1980s, farmers in parts of the old Transvaal province
bordering Kangwane and Gazankulu began to draw labour from the
designated resettlement areas for Mozambican refugees.54  The failure of
the former South African government to observe international norms for
the treatment of refugees had a marked impact on the conditions and
terms of access to employment of Mozambican refugees. For example,
international aid agencies and refugee organisations were unable to offer
the kind of refugee relief that was urgently needed.55  In its absence,
desperate people in search of a livelihood were forced to work on the
farms. There was no prohibition on the use of refugee labour by farmers.
Many other refugees moved to the towns and cities in search of work and
were absorbed into the temporary labour market of the Witwatersrand.
Now defined as “illegal aliens” under the law, they were liable for arrest
and deportation. Most of the Mozambicans deported in the late 1980s
were living and working in the urban areas where their status as refugees
was never recognised.
In 1994, a regional voluntary refugee repatriation programme was
operationalised by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM). The least
successful programme was in South Africa where, for a variety of reasons,
only 31 074 out of an estimated 350 000 refugees took advantage of the
programme.56  Of the 27 366 returnees from South Africa handled by the
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IOM, 19 986 were adults and the rest children. Only 7 356 refugees
returned through Ressano Garcia in southern Mozambique; one of the
districts of greatest ingress to South Africa by undocumented migrants in
the 1990s.57  The UNHCR’s returnee statistics show a total of 67 060
returnees from South Africa during the life of the agency’s programme,
with 36 951 to Gaza and 20 181 to Maputo provinces.58  Most returnees
were from the refugee camps in the old Gazankulu and Kangwane
bantustans, leaving large numbers of former refugees still in South
Africa, concentrated primarily in the eastern border areas with
Mozambique and in the townships and squatter camps of Gauteng.
The influx of people from a war-ravaged Mozambican economy into
South Africa has continued, and even escalated since 1990, producing a
major policy dilemma for both governments.59  They have been joined by
an escalating number of migrants and refugees from other parts of the
region, and increasingly Africa as a whole. The numbers involved are a
source of considerable controversy within South Africa, with wildly
variable estimates being thrown around. Before 1994, most estimates of
the total number of undocumented migrants were below two million
(although even the basis of that figure is unclear). By late 1994, police
were citing figures of eight million in total and 700 000 Mozambicans.60
This was hardly surprising; since those seeking more resources for
policing were always likely to exaggerate the figures. More alarming was
the pseudo-scientific justification for these kinds of numbers. The
Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) conducted a
methodologically suspect survey in 1994-5 and concluded that there
were 9.5 million non-South Africans (not necessarily all undocumented)
in the country.61  The HSRC concluded that there must be at least 2.8 to
three million undocumented migrants in the country and that there
might be “up to 9 million illegal immigrants”. The most accurate
estimate “may therefore be 5 to 6 million.” In their latest unpublished
report, the HSRC raises their estimate to as many as 12 million.62  These
kinds of figures are waved around by the press, certain politicians and
some commentators.63  Mathias Brunk has critically reviewed the figures
and rightly concludes that “we have too little knowledge to justify any
precise estimates or assumptions”.64
Under the Aliens Control Act of 1991, the South African authorities
can repatriate anyone who (a) entered South Africa clandestinely, (b)
failed to leave the country when their temporary residence permit
expired; and (c) breached the conditions of their visas by, for example,
taking up employment while classified as a holiday visitor. The
application of these provisions has provided the only reliable
government statistics available. The DHA keeps computerised records of
all whose temporary residence permits have expired and releases
k
k
k
k
k
k
k
k
k
k
k
k
k
k
k
k
k
k
k
k
k
k
k
k
k
k
k
k
k
k
k
k
MIGRATION POLICY SERIES NO. 1
19
6991lirpAotyraunaJ,yrtnuocyb,acirfAhtuoSnisyatsrevoasiV:2ELBAT
yraunaJ yraurbeF hcraM lirpA latoT
CDAS
alognA 613 381 952 821 688
anawstoB 7452 8791 2793 369 8549
ohtoseL 95891 17911 60041 8942 43384
iwalaM 7161 5811 9211 691 7214
euqibmazoM 7431 3411 7271 042 7544
aibimaN 809 255 6281 052 6353
dnalizawS 5723 2522 0206 3862 03241
ainaznaT 43 43 68 92 381
aibmaZ 324 982 026 291 4251
ewbabmiZ 8215 3364 81021 0042 97142
ACIRFA
anahG 09 35 39 92 562
suitiruaM 99 75 531 301 493
lageneS 36 47 59 53 762
adnagU 86 83 85 56 942
eriaZ 341 65 18 04 023
REHTO
ailartsuA 151 221 915 983 1811
airtsuA 98 99 504 401 796
muigleB 28 011 645 762 5201
lizarB 58 13 001 57 192
adanaC 851 731 274 802 579
kramneD 55 86 322 28 804
ynamreG 938 9631 8786 4281 01901
aidnI 072 501 612 741 837
dnalerI 19 111 703 431 346
learsI 37 06 713 161 116
ylatI 641 221 622 502 996
napaJ 98 24 081 68 793
yawroN 25 33 302 08 863
senipillihP 46 52 54 241 672
lagutroP 051 321 413 231 917
nedewS 98 281 514 702 398
dnalreztiwS 311 651 775 522 1701
nawiaT 072 611 743 313 6401
dnaliahT 71 32 54 542 033
KU 2951 7591 7416 7982 39521
ASU 054 373 3541 373 9413
unpublished data on request on a country-by-country basis for discrete
periods of time. The most recent overstay figures available are for January to
April 1996 (Table 2).65  To extrapolate a total number of undocumented
migrants from these figures is impossible for two reasons. First, there is no
record of how many overstayers subsequently leave the country, either
through normal ports or clandestinely. Second, this data says nothing about
Source: DHA
Note: Only countries with > 250 overstays are included. DHA reports a 6-month timelag in “logging” overstays. SADC
states naturally predominate. Immigration from elsewhere in Africa seems greatly exaggerated by commentators. Outside
the SADC, the biggest offenders are the UK, Germany, the USA and Australia.
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those who entered without visas or permits in the first place.
The DHA claims it is possible to calculate the total number of
undocumented migrants as a simple multiplier of the overstay figures. This is
obviously a problematic assertion. All that the data shows is, at one level,
how easy it is to gain legal access to South Africa and, at another, how
limited the sanctions are to persuade people not to overstay and/or to
change their purpose of visit. Why there should be such a high overstay rate
is not clear. Many migrants may have intended this in the first place; others,
through change in circumstances (such as finding employment), may have
decided to stay on and risk being ejected later for changing their purpose of
visit. Either way, it seems likely that entry to South Africa for temporary
workers is currently relatively easy, provided that the stated reason for entry
is not wage employment.
Still, it is clear that many migrants choose to enter South Africa
clandestinely by “border jumping”. South Africa has 7 000 km of borders
with six of the SADC states, and these borders are extremely porous. In the
case of Mozambique, electrified fencing and the location of the Kruger
National Park has tended to push “border-jumpers” southwards to the most
heavily policed and fortified border — running some 50km from
Komatipoort to Namaacha in Mpumalanga Province. Along the northern
border with Zimbabwe, a 137km electric fence was erected in 1986. Even
here, it appears to be relatively easy to gain access through or under the
fence. South Africa also shares a virtually unguarded 250km border with
Swaziland and a 1 000km border with Botswana. Numerous footpaths run to
South Africa through Swaziland from Mozambique and through Botswana
from Zimbabwe. Along the 60km stretch of border joining southern
Mozambique with northern KwaZulu/Natal, observers have recently
noted 80 “well-defined” footpaths across the international border.66
Landlocked Lesotho also shares a permeable boundary with South
Africa. Access by non-South Africans to South Africa by temporary
migrants is thus, in reality, virtually unrestricted and probably
uncontrollable.
Under the Aliens Control Act, overstayers and clandestine entrants
are both classified as “illegal aliens”. They are not distinguished in the
published or unpublished deportation figures issued by the police and the
DHA. Deportation figures show a dramatic escalation in the last 5 years
(Table 3). There is no necessary connection between deportation figures
and the actual numbers of undocumented migrants in the country,
however. First, the figures reflect the intensity of policing and the
resources put in to arresting and deporting migrants. Second, they do not
take into account the fact that many undocumented migrants are
individuals arrested and deported more than once a year.67  Third, even
the national background of deportees is no guide to the national
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5991-8891,acirfAhtuoSmorfsnacirfAhtuoS-nonfonoitatropeD:3ELBAT
8891 9891 0991 1991 2991 3991 4991 5991 latoT
alognA 1 4 1 81 93 36
anawstoB 757 348 695 406 854 501 84 11 2243
idnuruB 1 1 4 6
nooremaC 1 4 5 01
ognoC 2 7 5 21
tpygE 2 5 7
aipoihtE 1 6 7
aibmaG 1 2 3
anahG 1 1 9 33 94 66 951
aeniuG 1 1 6 8
tsaoCyrovI 1 4 11 61
ayneK 2 2 2 4 7 41 43 76
ohtoseL 0044 8274 2383 0444 5326 0902 3704 7804 58843
airebiL 1 1 7 9
iwalaM 842 011 87 771 751 052 893 4511 2752
ilaM 1 4 2 7
euqibmazoM 64433 85783 03324 47074 01216 69208 97217 986131 217605
aibimaN 733 912 88 446
airegiN 3 22 84 16 431
lageneS 1 96 8 87
naduS 1 2 3
dnalizawS 9381 0621 5221 8281 3822 987 189 738 24011
ainaznaT 7 4 6 51 74 25 142 638 8021
adnagU 1 1 6 3 4 51
eriaZ 31 49 22 02 73 681
aibmaZ 2 1 1 11 1 61 32 55
ewbabmiZ 7253 7185 3635 4717 33021 16801 13921 94571 55267
LATOT 52244 65515 81435 54316 57528 00669 29609 480751 594736
CDAS% 001 001 001 9.99 8.99 8.99 5.99 5.99 8.99
nacirfA% 0 0 0 1.0 1.0 1.0 3.0 2.0 1.0
rehtO% 0 0 0 0 1.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 1.0
breakdown of the undocumented population. Mozambicans, in
particular, are easy and cheap targets and are particularly vulnerable to
arrest and mass deportation.68  Fourth, there is evidence that the police
target inner-city areas and employment sites (such as construction sites)
in arresting undocumented migrants.
Given the difficulties of accurately determining the numbers of
undocumented migrants in South Africa, it is hardly surprising that
similar problems arise in the determination of participation rates of non-
South Africans in temporary employment.69  There are three reasons for
Source DHA
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this. First, many employees in these sectors are undoubtedly
undocumented migrants who, with their employers, have a vested
interest in not making their presence known to the authorities. One of
the basic problems with the system as it exists in South Africa, and
therefore a challenge to a proper management and monitoring system, is
precisely that many temporary employees are criminalised by existing
legislation. Second, there is no systematic collection of employment data
by the government in the sectors in which temporary workers tend to be
concentrated. Employers tend to be individuals, small companies and
contractors. There is no obligation for them to report employment
records, and no obligation to distinguish the place of origin of those
workers. Third, in the temporary employment sector there are no
centralised employment records (as there are, for example, for the
mining industry).70
The magnitude of unpaid work in South Africa is impossible to fix
with any accuracy. Estimates tend to vary considerably, even amongst
those supposedly in the know. The Mozambican Labour Office estimated
in 1995 that there were 100 000 Mozambicans in Mpumalanga and the
Northern Province and 20 000 Mozambicans working on Mpumalanga
farms. Algos, on the other hand, estimates that there are only 80 000
undocumented Mozambican migrants in the whole of South Africa, and
10 000 on Mpumalanga farms.71  Other estimates put the number of
Zimbabwean seasonal farm labourers in the Northern Province (and
more especially  the Limpopo Valley) at 7-8 000.72  There are no estimates
at all for the numbers working in other temporary employment sectors
such as construction, transport, and tourism and service industries.
In a 1994 survey, the National Labour and Economic Development
Institute (Naledi) undertook a survey of union shop stewards in an effort
to identify the extent of employment of undocumented workers from
outside the country.73  Union organisers noted that many of the
farmworkers they attempted to organise in Mpumalanga were foreign but
did not determine if they were employed illegally or were registered with
Article 41 permits. Large numbers of Mozambicans, Zimbabweans and
Malawians are employed in the hotel and restaurant sector. The
unionists argue that these workers undercut unionised workers by, for
example, agreeing to work in restaurants for tips only (an extremely
prevalent practice in South African restaurants). In the construction
industry, long an employer of Mozambican labour, unionists reported a
growing number of foreign workers. In most cases these workers are
employed by sub-contractors who pay wages of less than R300 per
month.74
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4. TEMPORARY WORKING CONDITIONS
The “illegal” status of many temporary workers in South Africamakes them vulnerable in two senses. First, they have norights and protection under law. Indeed, the primary aim ofexisting policy is to identify them, arrest them, and deport
them as expeditiously as possible. Second, some employers find this
vulnerability and insecurity attractive and are anxious to employ non-
South Africans precisely because they will accept wages and working
conditions which local workers will not.
The preliminary evidence suggests that working conditions andwages
on the farms and other temporary employment sectorsare often dire. The
exploitation of Mozambican refugees by employers in the 1980s has been
described as “rife.” One report argues that on white farms and in urban
areas “lack of documentation has rendered them vulnerable to super-
exploitation and abuse by employers”.75  Press reports in 1990 indicated
that some farmers were paying refugees only R30-R40 per month.
Professional labour touts were also reported to be dragooning labour from
Mozambique and bringing it over to the farmers at a fee of R100-150 per
head. These workers were virtual “slaves”. If they refused to work they
were reported to the police who then arrested and deported them.
The exploitation and abuse of vulnerable, impoverished illegal labour
may have persisted, and even intensified, in the 1990s. Migrants looking
for temporary work are doubly vulnerable to low wages and exploitative
working conditions. Cooper notes that “certain farmers are taking
advantage of the influx of illegals and the vulnerability of their illegal
status to pay poverty wages or not at all”.76  The South African
Agricultural and Plantations and Allied Workers Union (Saapawu)
notes that undocumented Mozambicans are willing to accept much worse
conditions than local workers. Wages are as low as R80 per month on
some farms (less than the legal minimum wage in Mozambique itself).
Non-payment is common. Workers are actively discouraged from joining
the union, and Saapawu has had little success recruiting Mozambicans.
Working conditions on the farms are bad: there are no health and safety
controls; poor accommodation; and no minimum wages.77
Conditions are worse for undocumented female and child workers
from Mozambique. The Naledi study reported harsh conditions on many
Mpumalanga farms. Farmers argue, as they always have, that no locals
will work for the wages that they can afford to pay. How generalised
these conditions are is hard to say. Larger farms and estates in the
Mpumalanga province rely not on Mozambican workers but on female
day labour which is trucked to the farms every day.78  A recent survey
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examining the status and treatment of female farm labourers from
Mozambique on eastern Mpumalanga farms paints a particularly
harrowing portrait of what happens when employers are unconstrained
by the law.79  These women, concludes the ILO, experience “shockingly
high levels of relative and absolute deprivation, even when compared to
(South African) female farmworkers.”80  Children of undocumented
migrants “face the most extreme exploitation” including hazardous
exposure to toxic substances.81  Wages for unskilled female agricultural
labour ranged from R3,50 to R10 per day. Wages on plantations in
Nelspruit are still several times higher than those on farms in the
Northern Province and the Western Cape.82  The City Press found
thousands working illegally on farms in the north for R90-R150 per
month. Minnaar and Hough report that on some farms in the Messina
area undocumented farmworkers are paid as little as R4 per day.83  In the
Northern Province, newspaper reporters found instances of child
labourers on farms being paid as little as R50 per month, with adult
wages only double that.84
There are recurrent reports in South Africa of employers
manipulating the “aliens control” system in the most shameless way. One
of the most common ploys, reported in both the farming and
construction industries, is to hire workers on a monthly contract and not
register them. Just before payday, a phone call to the local police ensures
that the workers will be rounded up by the Internal Tracing Unit (ITU)
and deported. Similar abuses have recently surfaced in the Western
Cape. In August 1996, police raided several farms in the Boland and
Ceres area and uncovered evidence of an organised trade in
undocumented farmworkers from Lesotho. Farmers allegedly fetched
“truck loads” of migrants from the border with Lesotho and transported
them down to the Cape where they were employed at wages of less than
R10 per day. Five Ceres farmers were charged with “aiding and abetting
illegal immigrants”.85
On this occasion the police and DHA co-operated to break an illegal
and exploitative traffic in human cargo. However, one researcher has
reported that in other parts of the country, such as Mpumalanga, there is
evidence of collusion between farmers and local officials86 :
These officials are “selling” Mozambican immigrants to farmers,
and the farmers, in turn, are “buying” bonded labour and
immunity from prosecution for employing immigrants. Farmers
pay for documents which legalise the status of Mozambicans, yet
they keep the papers. Thus, if the workers leave the farms, they
can be arrested and dealt with as illegals, as they have no
documentary evidence of their legal status. They are thus
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effectively the property of the farmers, and their bonded and
insecure status renders them open to exploitation and abuse.
The farmers, on the other hand, are protected from prosecution
as employers of illegal immigrants, as they have the documentary
evidence to prove that these workers are “legal.”
Other studies suggest that this kind of system notwithstanding, farmers
still have a great deal of difficulty “holding” their labour.
The growth of temporary work on the mines through sub-contracting
of non-core and core functions has had very direct implications for
working conditions in that sector. The NUM claims that subcontracting
“represents a new path to poverty and oppression”.87  Indeed, the move to
sub-contracting appears to be motivated in large part by the drive of
employers to circumvent or roll back the gains won by the NUM since
1982. Contractors’ labour is temporary labour, generally not unionised
and exempted from wage rates negotiated between the NUM and the
Chamber of Mines. Most workers are paid exclusively at piece work rates.
Employees are not covered by mine death and benefit schemes and
retirement savings schemes. The employment of low-wage contractors to
undertake core production functions has led to “tension and conflict”
with regular miners who are extremely vulnerable to retrenchment.88
In 1995, the NUM and the Chamber agreed that all subcontractors
would, in future, be compelled to “comply with applicable legislation”.
Hence there are now no longer legal barriers to joining a union.
However, since the raison d’être of sub-contracting is to subvert
unionisation, sub-contractors discourage involvement in unions and set
their own wages and employment conditions.89  The NUM has sought, so
far unsuccessfully, to be involved in all mine decision-making about sub-
contracting. The union has also issued a set of guidelines on contracting
out. The union wants each mine to provide reasons for contracting and
to provide an explanation for why the work cannot be done by regular
employees. It asks for details, on a mine-by-mine basis, of the numbers
involved; the type of work; the extent of unionisation; and level of
compliance with collective agreements. The NUM also demands that
wage rates and conditions of services should be no worse than those of
ordinary employees and that sub-contractors be barred from hiring
undocumented migrants.90
The drive to eliminate the employment of undocumented migrants as
temporary workers in mining is orchestrated by the NUM. In other
sectors, unions are similarly involved but lack the power to force employers
to stop this practice. Evidence concerning the working and living
conditions of undocumented migrants in other sectors is anecdotal at
best. Until more research has been conducted it is impossible to say how
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widespread the reported abuses actually are. However, even if it is
impossible to quantify the phenomenon it is worth mentioning the kinds
of abuses that have been reported in the press and by researchers. At the
very least, this gives some sense of the range of problems that confront
the development of a more humane and defensible temporary work
regime.
On the issue of legal protection, there are clearly a series of potential
or actual human rights issues to be addressed around the treatment of
migrants by those enforcing the Aliens Control Act — the police, DHA
officials, the courts and even researchers. There are suggestions that the
Internal Tracing Units (ITUs) enforce the Aliens Act with the same
vigour as they used to enforce the pass laws. In their drive to identify and
deport “aliens” the police have specifically targeted Mozambicans and
Zimbabweans and tend to raid the living and work places of migrants. In
the latter case, construction sites and pick-up points for day labourers are
particular targets. The police methods for “identifying” undocumented
migrants are chillingly described in police-speak by researchers Hough
and Minaar91 :
The internal tracing units of the SAPS have become adept at
spotting an illegal .... In trying to establish whether a suspect is
an illegal (sic) or not, members of the internal tracing units
concentrate on a number of aspects. One of these is language:
accent, the pronouncement of certain words. Some are asked
what nationality they are and if they reply “Sud” African this is
a dead give-away for a Mozambican, while Malawians tend to
pronounce the letter “r” as “errow”. In Durban many claim to
be Zulu but speak very little. Some of those arrested as illegal
aliens are found with home-made phrase books in their pockets.
Often they are unable to answer the simplest questions in Zulu
or are caught out if asked who the Zulu king is. Often the reply
is “Mandela” ....  Appearance is another factor in trying to
establish whether the suspects are illegal — hairstyle, type of
clothing worn as well as actual physical appearance. In the case
of Mozambicans a dead give-away is the vaccination mark on
the lower left forearm. Some Mozambicans, knowing this, have
taken to either self-mutilation (cutting out the vaccination
mark) having a tattoo put over it, only wearing long-sleeved
shirts and never rolling up their sleeves, or wearing a watch
halfway up the arm to cover the mark.
In the last three years the resources devoted to tracing, arresting and
deporting “aliens”, SADC citizens in particular, have increased
dramatically (Table 2). In 1994, the number of ITUs was increased from
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three (based in Nelspruit, Johannesburg and Welkom) to 14 (in most
major urban centres). The ITUs currently have 1 000 police personnel.
In 1993, the police established a national Aliens Investigation Unit to
investigate those aiding and abetting undocumented migrants. In late
1994, the Minister of Home Affairs called on the public to report
undocumented migrants to his department and the police. South African
citizens are offered rewards by the ITUs for calling Crime Stop numbers
and reporting non-South Africans.92  There are also numerous reports of
officials and policemen demanding bribes or protection money from
migrants to avoid arrest and deportation.
In contrast to the treatment of undocumented migrants, employers
have traditionally been treated very lightly by the authorities. Admission
of guilt fines and payment for the deportation costs of their employees
are common if charges are not pressed.93  Under Section 32 of the Aliens
Act, employers may also argue that they acted in good faith when
circumstances “were not of such a nature that (they) could reasonably
have been expected to suspect that the alien was in the Republic” in
contravention of the Act.94
In late 1994, the DHA declared that it would start cracking down on
employers but it is unclear what this has meant in practice. Algos in
Nelspruit reports that the DHA is “not going out of its way to impose
fines or round up illegals working on the farms.”95  The local DHA office
confirms that “we are not going out of our way to find them” and says
that “it is for the politicians to decide”.96  The Aliens Amendment Act
contains “stringent provisions” for employing “aliens” or entering into
business with them or harbouring them.97  The Act provides for fines of
up to R40 000 and imprisonment for up to five years for providing work
or aid to an “illegal alien” and makes employers liable for the costs of
repatriation.98  It remains to be seen whether the Amendment Act will
effect any changes in bureaucratic practices that discriminate in favour of
employers in the application of the law.
5. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
There is a sentiment within South Africa that the “two gates”policy is discriminatory for two reasons. First, the policy favoursmine over other employers. Second, it discriminates againstminers who remain perpetual contract workers and are denied
the right to more permanent residence and employment, as envisaged by
the Aliens Control Act. Within the regional context, the bilateral
accords also provide different terms of access to South Africa for
migrants from traditional mine sending areas and other countries such as
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Zimbabwe, Zambia and Namibia (with which there are no bilateral
agreements). In its June 1996 report the LMC explicitly calls for the
abolition of this “two gates” system and for a “modernised policy” based
on international norms and constitutional principles.99  Such a change is
inevitable in the longer term and is likely to be a central issue in the
promised Green and White Papers on immigration. If the bilateral labour
agreements are modernised but not abolished, then scope still exists for
temporary employment schemes of the kind governing farm labour
recruitment in Mozambique. What is more likely in the medium term is
that all migrants will eventually be brought under the aegis of a single
new Immigration Act. Whether that act will contain exemption clauses
of the kind in the Aliens Control Act, or whether it will itself prescribe
conditions for legal entry of temporary workers, remains to be seen.
In October 1995, following discussions with the NUM and the
employers, the South African Cabinet offered permanent South African
residence to mineworkers from outside the country who had been
working on the mines since 1986 and who had voted in the 1994
election.100  To date, 26 440 miners have applied for exemptions and a
further 20 924 are being processed (47 364 in total out of an eligible
population estimated at around 130 000 by Teba). These include 8 608
from Mozambique, 31 481 from Lesotho, 3 228 from Swaziland, 3 538
from Botswana, and 449 from Malawi.101  The miners’ amnesty is not of
direct concern to this report since most sub-contracted labour will be
unaffected. But it does indicate the direction in which the South African
government is moving at the executive level in its quest to normalise
minework and transform the migrant labour system to the mines. Of
more pressing relevance is the decision, announced in February 1996, to
offer a more general amnesty to non-miners.
The general amnesty was approved by Cabinet in February 1996 and
handed to the DHA for implementation. There was a stiff rearguard
action against the policy from some quarters in government who
promised dire consequences for the country if the amnesty went
ahead.102  The Cabinet insisted on implementation and in his Budget
speech of 6 June 1996, the Minister of Home Affairs announced that the
amnesty would proceed. Anyone is eligible to apply for permanent
residence who:
(a) is a citizen or permanent resident of a SADC country;
(b) has lived continuously in South Africa for longer than five years;
(c) has no criminal record; and
(d) has been gainfully employed or self-employed since before 1991; or
(e) has a spouse or children born in South Africa.
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The authorities have absolutely no idea about how many people will
apply for amnesty but estimate as many as 600 000 adding, with a
multiplier factor, 12 million people to the population of South Africa.
By the end of November 1996, following an extension of the amnesty
deadline by two months, about 200 000 people had applied. What is of
interest here are the potential implications of legalisation for the hidden
temporary work regime described in this report.
Clearly, the decision cuts across the logic and thrust of an existing
policy to isolate and deport all “illegals” irrespective of how long they
have been in the country, and this is one reason why the DHA
originally opposed the decision. But what the amnesty does mean, in
theory, is that long-time undocumented migrants reliant on temporary
work can now come above ground, regularise their status in the country
and seek employment without fear of harassment, arrest and
deportation. Whether this will spell the end of illegal temporary work is
doubtful, particularly since the decision does not affect migrants who
have come to the country in the last five years. But what it could mean
is that policing will now be more intensely targeted at these post-1991
immigrants to South Africa. The amnesty could therefore have positive
consequences for some undocumented temporary workers, in as much as
they will move outside the sanction of the Aliens Control Act. For
others it will make very little difference. There will still be employers
who will continue to find post-1991 immigrants a better option because
of their continued illegality and vulnerability.
The most radical and far-reaching vision for the transformation of
Southern Africa’s migration regime is embodied in the recent SADC
Draft Protocol for the Free Movement of Persons within Southern
Africa.103  The Protocol proposes progressively freer movement for all
people, including workseekers, within the SADC region and the
eventual elimination of all border controls within a period of ten years.
If adopted, such a plan would have three main implications for
temporary work by non-South Africans within the country. First, it
would mean open access to the South African job market for those from
the SADC states seeking temporary work in South Africa. Second, it
would decriminalise the activities of undocumented temporary workers
and bring temporary work above ground. Third, it would obviate the
need for bilateral accords and temporary employment schemes since, in
effect, there would be a single regional labour market open to all.
However, the SADC member states are deeply divided on the Protocol.
The South African government, in particular, does not favour the “open
borders” concept behind the Protocol.104
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6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The new South African government has faced a rapidly escala-ting influx of undocumented migrants from the region andfurther afield. The transformation in patterns of intra-regionalmigration in Southern Africa in the 1980s (with large-scale
refugee movements from Mozambique) and the 1990s (with a massive
escalation in legal and undocumented migration of workseekers to South
Africa from the region) has transformed the character of migration for
temporary work within the region. Clandestine migration to South
Africa is nothing new. In the past, legal and administrative instruments
— including immigration legislation, bilateral accords, and temporary
work schemes — were put in place to regulate informal cross-border
movements. These instruments have been literally swept aside by the
ineluctable force of post-apartheid population migration. The result is
that formalised temporary employment schemes have been seen as
increasingly unnecessary in the region, at least by employers.
The new migration regime has prompted rising demands from interest
groups within the South African population — such as organised labour
and hawkers groups — to adopt a blanket “South Africans first” policy in
the labour market.105  Employers, particularly the farmers and the mining
companies, have argued in public for the right of continued access to
foreign labour.106  Employers in other sectors — such as construction and
tourism — have made few public pleas but continue to employ non-
South Africans in considerable numbers.
Central to the xenophobic and anti-immigrant rhetoric which clouds
rational debate within South Africa is a set of arguments and images
about the negative impact for South Africans of the presence of unskilled
and semi-skilled foreigners in the country. The most common charges are
that “illegal aliens” cause crime, consume scarce resources, take jobs from
South Africans, depress wages, consume social services and exacerbate
unemployment. The circumstantial evidence suggests, however, that
undocumented migrants are well-represented in the ranks of temporary
workers and that their poor socio-economic position and undocumented
status in South Africa make them vulnerable to super-exploitation, low
wages, poor working conditions and abuse. These abuses seem to occur in
all three of the sectors in which they are primarily involved —
commercial agriculture, construction and the service industry.
To date, the political transformation in South Africa has made very
little difference to the lives of migrants entering South Africa for
temporary work or to non-South Africans living in the country and
engaged in temporary work. Apartheid era legislation (such as the Aliens
Control Act) and bilateral labour agreements continue to constitute the
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basic administrative structure of migration governance. Certain
employer groups, such as the mines and the farms, have continued to
enjoy special dispensations to recruit and employ foreign migrants
virtually at will. While there have been some improvements in working
and living conditions on the mines, working conditions on the farms
and in other sectors where temporary workers are concentrated remain
largely unregulated.
One problem is that unskilled and semi-skilled workers and work-
seekers within the region have no legal access to the South African
labour market. Since there is no hope of legal entry, there is no other
option but to border-jump. Whether the prospect of gaining legal
employment is actually a disincentive for border jumping has not been
established. But it would almost certainly not exacerbate an already
chronic problem. One concrete policy option articulated by the
Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) is the idea of
negotiated “quotas” with the neighbouring states. Another, now being
mooted in Mpumalanga, is to extend the Teba model of contracting to
other sectors, such as agriculture. The precise mechanisms are less
important at this stage than the validity of the proposition that partial
access to the South African labour market would have an inhibiting
effect on clandestine immigration as a whole.
It is clear that the operation of the country’s temporary employment
labour market, and the role and status of non-South African workers
therein, is particularly poorly documented and understood. This emerges
very clearly in both the Labour Market Commission report and the
accompanying ILO report. In this paper, I have tried to piece together a
coherent picture from the available evidence but it is clear that this
evidence is partial, fragmentary and unsystematic. Several concrete
recommendations therefore emerge from the review and analysis
presented in this paper:
• Resources should be devoted to a systematic and rigorous programme
of sectoral and community-level research focused on the sectors in
which temporary employment is particularly prevalent — mining,
agriculture, construction and the service industry;
• As a matter of urgency, it is recommended that the government
institute a formal enquiry into the labour practices and working
conditions in the temporary employment sector.
• Due consideration should be given to the status of non-South
African migrants from the SADC states in immigration reform.
Immigration policy in general — and the Aliens Control Act in
particular — provides few answers and little vision for the
governance of temporary migration for employment across national
borders in Southern Africa. The “two gates” policy needs to be
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revisited and reformulated. It is discriminatory for the reasons given
by the LMC. The Commission advances persuasive reasons for
bringing all immigration (temporary or otherwise) under a single new
Immigration Act.
• Policymakers need to make a clearer distinction between migration
and immigration; between temporary migration and permanent
migration. In behaviour and intention, many temporary workers are
migrants rather than immigrants. They come to South Africa for a
specific purpose and intend to go back in due course. South Africa
has an immigration policy, of sorts, but no coherent migration policy.
This is a policy gap that clearly requires attention.
• Bilateralism is not necessarily a bad or inefficient short-term policy
measure for dealing with cross-border migration by and between two
nation-states. What is also needed, in the specific historical and
geographical context of Southern Africa and the SADC, is a new
multi-laterialism in the area of population movement, akin to those
developing for trade, infrastructure and investment.
Governance of the new immigration regime seems to pose intractable
difficulties for policymakers in this area. There are four basic policy
positions currently being articulated in response to the influx of
undocumented migrants and, by extension, undocumented temporary
workers. By articulating the policy options as a series of actual or
potential models of governance, it becomes easier to identify their
respective premises, promises and failings. Models one and two are
generally acknowledged to be failing. A public debate around models
three and four is urgently needed.
MODEL ONE: FORTRESS SOUTH AFRICA MODEL
This is the traditional “sealed borders” approach of the ancien regime.
The policy model suggests that South Africa’s borders ought, and more
controversially can, be sealed to outsiders. In policy terms this would
mean pouring vastly increased resources into the blockading of South
Africa’s 7 000 km land border. One advocate of this view recommends
the “extensive use of floodlights, motion detectors and heat sensors” and
controversially claims that such measures along the Mexican-United
States border have “reduced the flow of illegal Mexicans into the US by
60%.”107  While advocates of this model see total control as unattainable
they continue to call for more resources to be poured into the effort
presumably on the grounds that there will be some deterrence effect.108
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MODEL TWO: HEARTLAND POLICING MODEL
The second (related) model suggests that control must be exercised in
the heartland not on the borders. By making undocumented migrants
lives so insecure and unpleasant through constant policing and
harassment, and prosecuting employers who hire them, the economic
incentives for coming to South Africa are reduced and the social costs of
living “illegally” in South Africa are raised.
The “heartland policing” model best describes the drift of South
African policy since 1994; the increase in ITUs from four to fourteen,
more resources directed at identifying and arresting migrants, and higher
deportation figures, are all indicative of this tendency. This model comes
at a cost: undocumented migrants often lose the few constitutional, and
most of the human, rights they are entitled to. Due process is often
conveniently put aside. Resistance, leading to open violence, intensifies.
Corruption seems to breed.
The Aliens Amendment Bill suggests that the DHA also wants to
adopt a get-tough approach with employers who hire undocumented
migrants. Greatly increased penalties on the books does not mean
greatly increased disincentives in practice. The old government was very
soft on employers who contravened the Act. Is that about to change? In
general, as long as there are sufficient undocumented migrants looking
for work — and employers willing to take advantage of their
marginalisation and vulnerability — temporary work in South Africa
will remain essentially unregulated and beyond the reach of progressive
temporary employment management schemes. There is also no
unanimity in government that large-scale prosecution of employers is a
productive or even viable strategy. Finally, prosecuting employers will
make precious little economic difference to the large numbers of
undocumented migrants who seek, and find, a living in the informal
economy.
MODEL THREE: THE FREE MOVEMENT MODEL
The third model is more of a “vision” of the future than a politically
viable policy option, at least in the foreseeable future. Often mistakenly
identified as advocating an immediate “open borders” policy, this model
of governance is best exemplified by the SADC Draft Protocol on the
Free Movement of Persons in Southern Africa. The Protocol would
commit the SADC states to a policy of free movement (along the
European Union model) within ten years. It is for that reason that a
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number of those states, including South Africa, have expressed grave
reservations about the Protocol. However, the Protocol also recommends
several other “intermediate” policy options, including freer movement
and a structure of permissive registration and governance. These
recommendations are consistent with the fourth model.
MODEL FOUR: THE CONTROLLED ACCESS MODEL
If undocumented migrants are going to come to South Africa anyway, it
is argued, surely it is better to regularise and monitor that movement by
legalising it, directing it, and managing it? This was certainly a strong
minority view within the recent Labour Market Commission. The
precise details of this management structure are less important than the
argument that by providing mechanisms for “undocumented” migrants to
document themselves, and bringing temporary work out of the sewers,
the incentives for rampant corruption, exploitation and abuse would be
reduced. The incentives for employing foreign migrants might then be
reduced, formal organisation of workforces would be easier, and wages
and working conditions would improve.
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